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It is written in the philosophy of Wang Yang-ming that "the prin-
ciples of righteousness have no fixed abode." In this expression of
oriental wisdom may be found a valid criticism of the occidental tendency
to sanctify transient law and to give to current notions of justice the
authority of divine commandments. It is a short step for those affected
with this tendency to proceed from condemning every violation of an
official order as a lawless act, to denouncing every criticism of an
established rule as an incitement to law-breaking. It is a short step
from advocating reverence for the law to insisting upon reverence for
the human being who announces or enforces the law.'
It is the purpose of this article to suggest some of the dangers arising
from the encouragement of this tendency, dangers threatening disinte-
gration of the social fabric, which is held together not by the rigidity
but by the flexibility of its legal strands. Human nature is not the
unchangeable quality assumed by those whose vision is limited to a few
generations. Human nature is a persistent development, wherein dom-
inating motives and purposes are transformed in strength and direction
from day to day under pressure of living conditions that are undergo-
ing constant changes through the increasing exploitation of natural
power by man power.
Let us consider one significant example of this mutability of human
nature, in order to make clear at the outset how interwoven is the fact
of the change of the individual attitude and the necessity for flexibility
in the legal rules of human conduct.
In the conditions generally prevailing in the world prior to the
industrial epoch each man relied largely upon himself or upon some
one directly under his influence to provide him with the necessities. of
life. He tilled the soil for the production of food. He raised domestic
animals or hunted wild beasts to furnish him with clothing. He cut
down trees or quarried stone with which to build him a shelter. If he
did not do these things himself he exercised power directly upon other
men to compel them to perform this service. The overwhelming major-
ity of men worked with their own hands to provide themselves with the
essentials of a tolerable existence.
Therefore it came about that the dominant social desire of this over-
whelming majority was for freedom from servitude to others. They
1 "An attack upon the judiciary is in fact an attack upon the union." Chief
Justice Marshall in 1821.
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resented any political system which supported a social system wherein
a large part of their labors benefited others4 whereby they were
deprived of the better food and clothing and shelter which they could
provide for themselves if they were free to labor wholly for themselves.
Thus the governments of the great states of the world were gradually
transformed from institutions for the enrichment of the lives of the
few into institutions for the partial protection of the liberties of the
many. The transformation has not been completed, largely because
of that resistant quality of the law, which retards the development of
an orderly society, to such an extent that explosive periods .of law-
lessness provide a recurrent warning against the abuse of legal power-
a warning least heeded by those who need it the most. But to a
considerable extent the desire of the individual to work for himself has
brought about in a few centuries the establishment of a legal principle
that economic freedom is a right which should be protected by
government.
During these centuries, however, the industrial development of society
has been steadily changing the nature of individual desires, so that to-
day, with the right of economic freedom only partially established, we
find the fact of economic dependence pressing heavily upon an enormous
proportion of the populations which participated in the debacle of a
world-wide war.
The workers in the industrial centers of the world are no longer able
to provide themselves with food or clothing or shelter. They are
dependent upon farmers, millers; truck-gardeners, garment-makers,
shoe factory. operatives, brick-makers, lumbermen, carpenters, masons,
transportation men. In a word, they are dependent for the absolute
necessities of life upon the continuous service of large groups of other
workers, usually remote from them and not subject to their influence
in any fixed way except through the processes of government. The
workers on the farms retain a measure of independence as to food and
shelter; but for the enjoyment of the living conditions possible to
industrious citizens of the modern state they are also dependent upon the
continuous labor of their fellow-workers.
This interdependence of the citizenship of a twentieth century nation
has brought about a pronounced change in the motives and purposes of
the individual. When the Constitution of the United States was adopted
it was a matter of primary concern to "secure the blessings of liberty"
by the establishment of a government which, in the language of the
Massachusetts Constitution would "furnish the individuals who compose
it with the power of enjoying in safety and tranquility their natural
rights." It will be generally agreed that the "natural rights" thus to be
protected by government were not thought of as including any right to
the co6perative service of one's fellow-men. Yet today it is apparent
that, unless government insures in some manner the continuous inter-
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change of services, the enjoyment of natural rights by individuals will
not be sufficient to furnish a majority of the inhabitants of the United
States with food and clothing.
Thus in the development of 'ethics we hear today much talk of the
"public right" to have coal mined and to have interstate commerce
by railroads maintained. Behind this talk of the vague "public right"
there is a definite feeling of a private right of each individual to require
another individual, upon whom he is dependent for the necessities of
tolerable existence, to perform his specialized function in the complicated
industrial organization of modern society. The individual is not always
keenly impressed by, or responsive to, his obligations to another; but
he is usually well aware of the other fellow's obligations to him.
It is not the present purpose to attempt a definition of prevailing
ethics in answer to the ancient question: "Am I my brother's keeper ?"
The discussion up to this point has been intended merely to demonstrate
that, in a period of approximately one hundred years, human nature
has been so altered in motive and purpose that men now turn to a
government which was established chiefly to secure individual happiness
through the preservation of individual freedom of action, and seek to
use its power to secure individual happiness through restriction upon,
and direction of, individual action. From the demonstration of this
proposition it should be evident that there must be great flexibility in
the law that is to hold together the social fabric wherein such radical
changes in the common thought are possible within so brief a space of
time.
Let us now consider the development of ethics in narrower fields
where the changes come more rapidly and meet less tolerable resistance
in the law. The enormous increase of scientific information in the
last one hundred years' arouses the wonder of all who study history.
It seems as though humanity, after stumbling along in darkened jungles
for much longer than a hundred thousand years, had suddenly emerged
upon open fields, where in the broad light of day great roads had
become visible leading into lands of promise more wonderful than ever
imagined by the greatest dreamers of by-gone ages. Mankind has
rushed madly along these roads, following the pioneers of science.
New arts have been revealed, new natural resources have been uncovered.
New methods have been devised of utilizing long-hidden treasures of
earth and sky and sea for man's pleasure. New realms of thought have
been opened to minds freed by the new knowledge from ancient doubts
and fears.
It has been inevitable that new standarts of right and wrong, new
appraisements of what is good and bad, have developed in the new
human being that is being bred in these changed conditions. "Man is
the creature of his environment." This trite phrase refers not to the
physical structure of man, which changes slowly even under great envi-
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ronmental change, but refers with far greater emphasis to the mind of
man.2  Is it necessary to bring to mind a thousand truthful tales of life
in the South Sea Islands, of life on the Western plains, of life in China
and Japan, of life in the mansions and in the hovels of London, Paris,
and New York, in order to prove that the ideals, the desires, and the
ethics of human beings vary according to their environment? Thus it
follows that the ethics of 1922 resemble the ethics of 1822 about as little
as the living conditions of today resemble those of one hundred years
ago.
"Human nature doesn't change," grumbles the disillusioned old man
and the sophisticated stripling. Neither does air nor water nor earth
change in its fundamental constituents. But the City of New York,
made out of the same physical elements, is not the same as the city of
Babylon, no matter how often the lover of metaphors may so describe it.
Nor does the man of the airplane and the radio, who has harnessed the
lightning, think as did the man of the chariot and the trumpet, who
believed that thunderbolts were hurled by a large angry person who
wore a long gray beard.
We learn from day to day how ignorant and mistaken were our
ancestors about many of the most important things in life-just as
posterity will learn of our ignorance and smile at our mistakes. Yet
in one field of thought we receive constant admonishment ever to rever-
ence age and to distrust youth, to persist in old folly rather than to
seek new wisdom. That is the field of the law.' The tallow candle was
supplanted by the oil lamp, the oil ]amp by the gas light, and the gas
light is giving way to the electric bulb. But the precedents of the
tallow candle and the oil lamp and the gas light are dragged daily into
a courtroom illuminated by .electric bulbs.
Let us examine a few of the tallow-candle precedents. The rule in
Foakes v. Beer,4 that "payment by the debtor of a less sum than the
whole amount of the debt, will not extinguish the debt, although the
creditor expressly agrees to receive it in full and gives a receipt or writ-
ing to that effect, is well established by abundant authority."-, This
quotation "gives expression to a rule which prevails in most English and
American jurisdictions." The rule is based on the legal theory that
there is no consideration for the promise to release the portion of the
debt unpaid. No twentieth century mind can justify the ethics of this
ruling. But it is the law. It gives judicial sanction to bad faith. For
'E. G. Conklin, The Direction of Human Evolution (1921); J. H. Robinson,
The Mind in the Making (i921).
'Lord Bacon in his essay, Of Innovations, writes: "It is good also not to try
experiments in States, except the necessity be urgent, or the utility evident ..
' (1884, H. L.) 9 A. C. 6o5.
'Ludington v. Bell (1879) 77 N. Y. 138, 143. See also ii L. R. A. (N. s.)
ioi8, note.
'Ferson, The Rule in Foakes v. Beer (922) 31 YAIz LAW JOURNAL, I5.
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any living person to attempt to justify this ruling is simply to exhibit
the anachronism of a medieval mind in a modern body. "The rule has
always been regarded as more logical than just," wrote James Barr
Ames.7 Yet the logic justifying obedience to law is that by this means
justice will be enforced so far as possible. Then by what logic is the
law-giver to justify the enforcement of deliberate and easily avoidable
injustice?
Every lawyer is familiar with the struggle to get rid of the fellow-
servant rule and the doctrine of assumed risk. Here was a situation
where changel conditions made an absurdity of a once reasonable rule."
Yet the courts in reverence to the past preferred to support an absurdity
and to do injustice, rather than to announce officially that new ethics
had developed out of a new environment.
During the recent war the Supreme Court of the United States held
the child labor law to be unconstitutional as an interference with states'
rights.9 The act attempted to prevent interstate commerce in the
Two Theories of Consideration (1899) 12 HARv. L. REV. 515.
8
"The two defenses which the legislature has thus attempted to take away
are not entrenched behind any express constitutional provision, nor were they
originally created by legislative action. They were both evolved by the courts.
..... The precedent once made was generally followed, until it became but-
tressed by a multitude of decisions in practically all of the jurisdictions whose
jurisprudence is founded upon the English common law." Borgnis v. Falk Co.
(p1) 147 Wis. 327, 352, i33 N. W. 2o9, 216. The opinion of Chief Justice
Winslow in this case contains an eloquent exposition of the necessity for
changing law to meet changing conditions:
"It is matter of common knowledge that this law forms the legislative response
to an emphatic, if not a'peremptory, public demand. It was admitted by lawyers
as well as laymen that the personal injury action brought by the employee against
his employer to recover damages for injuries sustained by reason of the negli-
gence of the employer had wholly failed to meet or remedy a great economic
and social problem which modern industrialism had forced upon us, namely, the
problem of who shall make pecuniary recompense for the toll of suffering and
death which that industrialism levies and must continue to levy upon the civilized
world. This problem is distinctly a modern problem. In the days of manual
labor, the small shop with few employees, and the stage coach, there was no such
problem, or if there was it was almost negligible. Accidents there were in those
days and distressing ones, but they were relatively few, and the employee who
exercised any reasonable degree of care was comparatively secure from injury.
There was no army of injured and dying with constantly swelling ranks march-
ing with halting step and dimming eyes to the great hereafter. This is what
we have with us now, thanks to the wonderful material progress of our age,
and this is what we shall have with us for many a day to come. Legislate as
we may in the line of stringent requirements for safety devices or the abolition
of employers' common-law defenses, the army of the injured will still increase,
the price of our manufacturing greatness will still have to be paid in human
blood and tears. To speak of the common-law personal injury action as a
remedy for this problem is to jest with serious subjects, to give a stone to one
who asks for bread. The terrible economic waste, the overwhelming temptation
to the commission of perjury, and the relatively small proportion of the sums
recovered which comes to the injured parties in such actions, condemn them as
wholly inadequate to meet this difficulty." 147 Wis. at p. 347 et seq., 133 N. W.
at p. 215.
9Hammer v. Dagenhart (i918) 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529.
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products of the anti-social labor of children. It should be clear to law-
yers and even to laymen that when these products became a part of inter-
state commerce, inasmuch as Congress has exclusive control over inter-
state commerce, there could not be any states' rights in this commerce
which were interfered with by the act. The ethics of a vast majority
of the population of the United States had undoubtedly developed to
the point where it was regarded as wrong to .permit interstate commerce
in the products of child labor-just as the prevailing ethics condemned
interstate transportation of lottery tickets. Yet the most charitable
criticism possible of the Supreme Court's decision is to say that the
court, in its preference for old rather than new thoughts, disregarded its
own readings of states' rights under the electric light of modern thought
and returned to the tallow-candle vision of days before the Civil War.
This child labor opinion shows the baleful effect upon the reasoning
powers of sanctifying the law and bowing in continual reverence before
-the wisdom of earlier generations. Indeed it is essentially an immature
quality of mind that insists on reverencing that which must be obeyed.
A boy may be required to obey an ignorant, dishonest, evil minded
father. It will be admitted that some fathers are not wise, honest, and
noble. No true friend of such a boy would desire him to reverence such
a father. Yet those eminent leaders of the bar who are constantly
advocating h positively servile respect for the Majesty of the Law
are the very persons who, by their stiff-necked opposition to every effort
to increase the flexibility of the law, do the most to create disrespect for
the law; and to undermine confidence'that justice will be administered
in response to the prevailing ethics.
The revered fathers of this republic lacked the ethical wisdom to write
into the constitution a prohibition against slavery; and this failure,
which resulted from the undeveloped ethics of that period of history,
eventually brought about a civil war. At the end of that war another
group of revered statesmen amended the constitution to provide thht the
right to vote should not be denied by any state on account of color. Let
it be asked how many of the eminent gentlemen, who orate so nobly
about the sanctity of law, are willing to see that part of the fundamental
law enforced, so that today all the public officials of the southern states
would be elected by a dominating vote of colored men and women?
The most important conclusion which should come out of this last
consideration is that respect for, and obedience to, law cannot be
obtained unless the law is continually responsive to the ethical demands
of the people upon whom the governmental authority is to be imposed.
It is, therefore, imperative that the law should never be held a sacred
heritage, that the law-makers and the law-givers should ever bear
in mind that "the principles of righteousness have no fixed abode," and
that the constitutional provision, the statute, or the decision that yester-
day expressed the ripest wisdom of the ages may become anathema
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tomorrow and may be a barrier to progress and a menace to the
general welfare."0
Particularly it should be made clear that in two great fields of
jurisprudence there is a constant necessity to tear down and to rebuild.
The first to be considered is the field of crime, and the second the field
of industry. Criminal law has developed out of ethical premises that
have been largely discarded in modern thought. Industrial law has
developed out of conditions of production in small units that have prac-
tically disappeared in modern large unit operations. As a result much
of the criminal law of to-day is as worthy of reverence as a barbarian
idol in a Christian church; and a large portion of the industrial, law,
as a vehicle of justice, is about as useful as a stage coach would be for
a journey from -New York to San Francisco. If these seem exag-
gerated metaphors let us consider a few accepted moralities side by
side with prevailing legal procedure.
The ancient idea of crime and punishment was, first a commandment
of divine sanction and then the wreaking of vengeance upon the violator.
The priest or ruler issued the commandment and punished the offender
against his will; his will commonly being described as the will of God,
in order to add to the fear of temporary pain, the horror of everlasting
agony. The deepest students of the criminal law have agreed that it is
founded in the thought of vengeance. The softening influences of
civilization have evolved a theory that the purpose of punishment should
be reform; and the law-givers have continued in the ancient process of
vengeance, while paying deference to the gentle-minded by asserting
that their real desire is to reform the erring and to teach them the ways
of the righteous.
Meanwhile science has brought forward and demonstrated the import-
ance of two disturbing factors-the limitations upon individual free
will and the social responsibility for individual transgressions. For
many centuries the person obviously insane, the congenital idiot, has not
been generally held to be responsible for his offenses. But recent
extensions of the frontiers of physiology and psychology have shown
the existence of partial abnormalities of infinite number and variation.
We read somewhat impatiently of the "crimes" of subnormals, of
morons, of defectives, of perverts-persons mentally diseased from
birth or by vicious education. We still clamor that they should be
sternly punished. Yet, if we know anything of the scientific informa-
tion which is at our command, our consciences advise us that we have no
right to wreak vengeante upon these irresponsibles."
We must protect the healthy against the sick. We must prevent the
"' "The political or philosophical aphorism of one generation is doubted by the
next, and entirely discarded by the third; the race moves forward and no Canute
can stay its progress." Borgnis v. Falk Co. (IgI) 147 Wis. 327, 349, 133 N. W.
209,215.
' Clarence Darrow, Crime: Its Cause and Treatment (1922).
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spread of contagious diseases. The mind as well as the body may be
contaminated. Society must protect itself against the anti-social indi-
vidual. This much we all agree upon. But to avenge with cruelty a
wrong, to do harm to a wrongdoer, is a method of "protection" originat-
ing in the primal self-centered instinct of the savage to strike down
the one offending him, without any knowledge of, or interest in, the
cause of the offense or the moral responsibility of the offender.
There is a maxim of our law which indicates the survival of this wit-
less instinct most clearly: "A man is presumed to intend the natural
consequences of his acts." Ordinarily evidence is admissible to over-
throw any legal presumption. But the criminal courts of today will
not permit the introduction of evidence that is absolutely necessary to
destroy this presumption originating in Neanderthal skulls and pre-
served by authoritative stupidity. Adequate evidence will not be
admitted to show either lack of mental capacity, unless classed as
"insanity," or lack of technical knowledge, which would demonstrate
that the accused could not possibly have known and therefore could not
possibly have intended the consequences which naturally followed upon
his act. In the light of this presumption we may observe that a verdict
of guilty and a sentence of imprisonment should always be most gratify-
ing to the accused, because these are the natural consequences of his act,
which he is presumed to have intended to accomplish!
The intent is the essential element in every criminal act. But it is a
hard task to prove an intent, that is, to demonstrate a mental process.
Therefore, the law avoids the difficulty by establishing the doctrine that
the intention is presumed from the act! This logic has truly barbaric
simplicity. But how does it sound in the mouth of an educated man of
the year 1922? This man may not go so far as to deny the existence of
any free will, although many a deep thinker of today will go that far.
But any fairly well educated man should know that at least there are
many very important limitations upon free will.
He should know, for example, that great fear produces physical
changes in the vital organs of the body, changes that have been photo-
graphed extensively during the world war.1 2 He should know, for
example, that the size and functioning of the adrenal gland largely
determines the physical courage or cowardice of the individual. With
even these bits of knowledge he may understand that the responsibility
for an act committed in a panic of fear may lie with the person who
created the fear. He may also understand that an act may have been
deliberately intended if done by a naturally courageous person; or that
the same act may have been practically involuntary, if done by a person
whose excessive timidity is the result of a physical deficiency and utterly
beyond the control of his will.
' G. W. Crile, A Mechanistic View of War and Peace (1915) ; W. B. Cannon,
Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, and Fear (1915).
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We have come to realize something of the irresponsibility of children
for crimes, to apportion some of the blame upon parents and some upon
the social environment. We have partially developed juvenile courts to
modify for children the rigors of the punishments provided for adults.
But how far has this intelligent attitude been extended to the treatment
of persons of mature years who have the mentalities of children; and
how far to the treatment of those who only exhibit the criminal products
of their education after they have reached maturity?
It may be admitted that we have not yet arrived at scientific measures
of individual and social responsibiliy for crime, but it is plainly evident
that the doctrine of complete individual responsibility survives only among
the ignorant. It is evident that the existence of ethics recognizing even
partial social responsibility for crime is incompatible with the survival
of a law of vengeance. Thus we find the foundations of the criminal
law are unsound. We cannot rebuild safely and usefully the ancient
structures reared upon such insecure foundations. We must begin to
build anew and to transfer the operations of government as rapidly as
possible into modern buildings. In the period of such a need how*
strange it is to hear supposed leaders of legal thought call upon us to
observe the majestic beauty and the enduring construction of that house
of the law that is crumbling before our eyes ! How strange it is to hear
them call upon us to lay wreaths before the statues of the ancient builders
of those foul dungeons and dismal courtrooms wherein for centuries
strong armed, dull-witted men have done unforgivable wrongs to their
weaker brethren!
It would require many volumes to detail the growth of our industrial
law and to demonstrate how inadequate are its fundamental rules and
deep-rooted precedents for the solution of modern problems. The
present space will only permit of a few scattering examples.
The sources of industrial Jaw will be found under the significant
title of "Master and Servant." The relation of master and servant,
which largely grew out of the relation of master and slave, has provided
the basic theory of industrial law. In other words, industry has been
regarded as an operation conducted by an "owner" and primarily for
his benefit. In later development some modification of this theory has
been found in industries of such importance to the general public as to
be described as "affected with the public interest." In such industries
the rights of "owners" have been restricted, not for the benefit of the
employees, but for the benefit of the consumers of the product of the
industry.
Through all industrial law, consciously felt and directly expressed,
or unconsciously assumed and indirectly enforced, appears the dominat-
ing conception that the primary objective of industry is the enrichment
of the owner of the property or tools utilized in the industry; and that
the objectives of the public and of the workers are secondary. In other
words, the ethics expressed in industrial law have been the ethics of
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primitive men. The underlying premises have been little affected by
ideas of social responsibility or of the interdependence of man upon man
in modern life. 3
As a result, in a time when the dependence of one worker upon
another is so obvious that there is a general demand that workers should
be in some manner compelled to continue to render necessary services,
there is lacking, except in the public utility field, any simultaneous and
equally strong demand tfiat the owners of properties, the use of which is
necessary to the general welfare, should be compelled to keep those
properties in service and should be restricted to a reasonable compensa-
tion for their use.
The low level of industrial ethics undoubtedly is partly responsible for
the inadequacies of industrial law; but here again, as in the field of
criminal law, community ethics have developed far beyond those yet
expressed in the law. The legal precedents which developed out of the
relation of "master and servant" in a small establishment provide utterly
inadequate standards for judging the rights and wrongs, the good and
the evil, in the workings of a modern industrial organization, where a
billion dollars worth of property may easily be subjected to a concen-
trated control; and where the employment of half a million men and the
furnishing of supplies necessary to the life of a nation of one hundred
million people may thus be affected by the self interest and emotional
prejudice of a small group of ignorant and abnormally greedy men.
To discuss the rights of the employees and the rights of the public
in an enterprise of this importance, in the same terms in which one
might discuss the rights of the employees and the rights of the public in
a shop employing half a dozen workers and serving perhaps two hun-
dred or three hundred people, is largely a waste of time. Yet this is the
method whereby the courts cumbersomely have sought to work out solu-
tions of industrial problems. No one would suggest that precedents for
regulating the conduct of a toddling child would be particularly valuable
in regulating the conduct of a mature and exceptionally strong and able
man. But the power of a modern industrial unit to do good or evil is,
in comparison with the power of an industrial unit of two hundred years
ago, much greater than the power of a mature man in comparison with
that of a little child.
Just as is true in the case of the criminal law, a sound structure
of industrial law requires absolutely new foundations; foundations
in community ethics which arise out of present day conditions. The
most important fact in present industrial conditions is that all industry
which is vitally important to the community is organized in such large
units and under such concentrated control that the establishment and
enforcement of community rights in every branch of such industrial
operations is unavoidable. We may differ as to the machinery for
'Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (iig) 2o4 Mich. 459, 17o N. W. 668.
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enforcement, but we cannot differ as to the necessity. We may all agree
that men in the privacy. of their homes should not be permitted to
enslave or torture those dependent upon them. Yet we will probably
agree also that to prevent such cruelties it is not necessary for the state
to regulate the details of family life. According to similar logic we
may believe that it is necessary to establish and to enforce social ethics
in business operations, without believing that it is necessary to put pub-
lic officials in charge of those operations. We may enforce social ethics
without adopting the specific program called "socialism."
The drift of the times can be shown clearly in a consideration of the
subject of fixing wages as a matter of law, concerning which there is
now widespread discussion. The demand for wage-fixing by law
arises from the failure of the directors of industry to organize labor
co6peratively and thus to insure its self-interest in continuity of pro-
duction. The natural law arising out of modern industry is that the
co6perative interchange of services between groups of labor is essential
to the maintenance of, tolerable living conditions. Yet today the
workers in the transportation industry may go on strike and thus
cripple all other industries and still receive the support of workers in
those industries they cripple. This is because those workers recognize
the fact that primarily they are being used as profit machines for the
benefit of a few and that only secondarily are they being used as parts
of a co6perative machinery of service for the benefit of the many. They
have a keener sense of a common interest in the effort of other workers
to get better wages than in the effort of employers to produce the goods
required by their fellow-workers.
But as the lack of effective voluntary co6peration increases community
discomfort a demand increases for forced co6peration. It follows
ancient lines. When the regulative power of competition lost force
in public utilities there arose social ethics asserting a right to compel
service at rates fixed as reasonable by public authority. The legal
principle was established that profits should be limited to "reasonable
compensation" for property used. But one factor was left unregulated
-the fixing of "reasonable compensation" for the labor utilized.
Recently the development of organized labor power to the point of
stopping or gravely interfering with the conduct of important industries
has created an ethical interest in wages; and, as is typical of human
ethics, it is a selfish interest, not to insure that the worker shall have fair
wages in order to satisfy his needs, but to insure that he shall work in
order to satisfy the public needs dependent on his continuity of service.
Perhaps it should have been suggested earlier in this discussion that
ethics are not to be confused with ideals. Prevailing ethics are merely
the standards of conduct generally regarded as in the interest of the
largest number of persons. The ethics of primitive people are concerned
with small and immediate interests and the ethics of more enlightened
folk involve their larger and more remote interests. But developed
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ethics are simply accepted standards of community interest and as such
should be embodied in law with less resistance than would meet devel-
oped ideals, which, as minority products, obtain community sanction
very slowly.
However, fixing wages is not an isolated problem. The vast majority
of the population of a modern state is dependent on wages. The wage
in one industry affects another. The wage in dollars means nothing
until it is translated into commodity terms. But if wages are to be
fixed in dollars on the basis of the purchasing power of the dollar, then
some control over prices must be established to insure that the purchas-
ing power granted shall be maintained; or else the wage-fixers will
engage in a continual losing race with the price-fixers.
Again, if the profits of labor out of industry are to be fixed by law it
follows that from the overwhelming majority of workers there will
develop the ethics that the profits of those who invest money shall be
limited likewise. The precedents for this are already established in
public utility service. If a business is affected with the public interest
so deeply that wages of labor should be fixed by law, it is plain that the
price of the product and the wages of capital must also be regulated.
From these considerations we must develop a new ethical conception
of the function of industry and what rewards should be allowed to
those who carry on industrial operations and how the rewards should be
divided. Under the small unit operations of former centuries the philos-
ophy of individualism was simple and sufficient. A man worked for
himself to satisfy his immediate needs. His chief interest in his govern-
ment was a hostility toward a power that compelled him to work for
others and an affection for a power that compelled others to leave him
free to work for himself. In the complexity of modern industrial opera-
tions there is growing a demand for a governmental power to insure to
each man in exchange for his labor the codperative supply of a reason-
able share of the products of the labor of others.
Yet in the face of these developing ethics the law of industry
announced by the highest courts in the land is founded on the ancient
doctrine that the main purpose of industry is individual profit. It is
only in the limited sphere of industry admitted to be affected with the
public interest that this doctrine is modified. The ethical idea of "profit"
is an individual right to get as much as possible from others in exchange
for giving as little as possible. Naturally it follows that those seeking
to get as much as possible for the smallest amount of mental labor are
foremost in denouncing the effort of those who seek to get as much as
possible for the smallest amount of manual labor.
The man most keenly ambitious to make a fortune in ten years that
will give him an income without work for the rest of his life is naturally,
but comically, most indignant at every effort of the skilled laborer to
get more money for less work. His ethics, announced as "a full day's
wage for a full day's work" are not the ethics of democracy because they
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call for a "full day's work" from one class in order that another class
may avoid equal labor. They are not ethics of co6peration consistent
with the necessities of modern interdependent society but ethics of
profit that grew out of the opportunities of an older individualistic social
order.
The development of the ethics of co6peration made necessary by the
fact of the co6perative character of modern industry spells the eventual
rejection of the older ethical ideas that justified the legal theories of the
right of profit. The oncoming ethics of co6peration are incompatible
with the prevailing laws of profit.
It has been a necessity arising from the spatial limits of this condensed
presentation that the case to be considered has been only stated and no
attempt has been made to prove it. The underlying facts are readily
available to any student. The social condition described is not one
which theorists may assume to be developing, but is the condition of life
which exists in the United States of America today. We are living in
a period of such an organization of production and distribution of the
necessities of life that the co6perative exchange of labor must be a
continuous process, as any stoppage results in the sudden submergence
of vast numbers of peoples in waves of misery and acute want, which
they could not foresee, or foreseeing, could not escape. The grim aid
relentless facts of modern life are developing modern ethics-a code of
right and wrong based primarily on the applied instinct of self-
preservation.
The ancient ethics of self-sufficient individualism and individual
responsibility survive most unhappily beyond their useful years through
the preservative quality of the law. The natural resistance of law is
increased by the natural density of the legal mind. The very qualities
that insure the making of a good lawyer insure this mental solidity. No
one alive to the egregious blunders of even the greatest leaders of human
thought and action can preserve reverence for any human institution
merely because it is old. The older it is the more certain is it that in its
construction are great masses of crumbling thought and rotting assump-
tions that endanger the safety and usefulness of the entire structure.
We learn from the wisdom of our sires largely what mistakes we may
avoid and obviously none of the truths that we are to discover.
The law is not a science and its rules are of little permanence. We
cannot build as the natural scientist may-laying one truth upon another
-because we do not quarry truths in the work of law-making. The
law is the temporary expression in a temporary pattern of the ever
changing ethics of the human will behind the law. The rules whereby
men may live together in comparative peace and for mutual advantage
are set forth in the law; and as the conditions of living change it is
obvious that the law must change.
Yet there is a resistance to change inherent in the institutions for
creating and enforcing the law. There is obvious virtue in certainty and
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permanence in the law. But in a time of rapid development in the pro-
cesses that determine living and working conditions, it is inevitable that
the value of permanence in legal rules must give way before the neces-
sity of consistently rapid development of law. There is no period in
all the known history of mankind wherein there has been such speed and
sweep in the development of living and working conditions as during our
lifetime. The resistance of the law to-the pressure of new ethics has
impaired the common faith in an appeal to law for the decision of con-
tending claims of right. It has been borne in upon the consciousness of
masses of people that injustice of vast consequence is-perpetuated in the
name of law and that far too often the law is utterly inadequate to pro-
mote the general welfare in matters where the power of government
offers apparently the only force capable of checking abuses of private
power developed under legal sanction.
In such a time as that in which we live the abstract praise of law and
order is often an actual incitement to lawlessness among those who
suffer daily discomfort and periodic misery from the resistance of the
law to enforcement of what they know to be their rights. Think of the
reactions in homes of poverty, among undernourished, undereducated
men and women, when the law is invoked to force the acceptance of
inadequate wages, to perpetuate living conditions of poor food, scanty
clothes, and wretched housing; and when simultaneously that same law
is invoked to protect the squeezing of a fortune out of underpaid labor
as a "right of property." Think of the reactions when the products and
victims of abnormal environment suffer the vengeance of the criminal
law because they do not behave like normal persons!
In a time when the spirit of lawlessness is increasing the trivial-minded
may enjoy writing and listening to speeches extolling the obvious advan-
tages of "law and order.". But studious persons will realize that law-
lessness develops out of law inadequacy and will seek first to analyze
the wrongs that are promoted and the rights that are denied by pre-
vailing law and then to devise, not new statutes based on old ideas, but
new legal theories responsive to new ethical demands.
To protect its inhabitants many an ancient city was, surrounded by
a wall that, in the course of generations, it was found necessary to tear
down as a barrier to progress. A great wall was once reared across
the path of a nation's enemies and behind that wall the nation in unhappy
security decayed. The fortifications of one generation may be the
prison walls of the next. It is in the ethics of today rather than in the
resistant law-of yesterday that we should seek for the source and sanction
of those rules of conduct that will insure the peace and good order of
society.
